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Executive Summary 
Overview 
This report is the second of four on policy options and market based 
incentives for managing the resources in the Onkaparinga Catchment 
Water Management Board (OCWB) area.  The four reports are being 
produced as part of a research agreement between the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Board and the CSIRO Land and Water 
Division, Policy and Economic Research Unit. The first study provides 
an overview of the institutional framework for managing resources in 
the catchment and potential impediments to good natural resource 
management.  
This second report focuses on pricing water to manage the catchment 
water resources in a sustainable manner.  A key conclusion of this 
report is that there are significant opportunities to improve resource 
use through pricing policy changes.  Many of the price policy 
opportunities outlined are challenging because they require action 
from State government and local agencies and can not be implemented 
by the Board alone.  While, the Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board doesn’t hold all of the levers to set these policies, 
the board can have influence with well informed and persuasive 
arguments. This report and the remaining reports in this series are 
aimed at giving the Board strategic information it can use to maximise 
its influence. 
Report Conclusions 
The main objective of the report is to identify potential opportunities 
to improve resource management in the catchment through price 
policy reform.  The report identifies pricing policy reform 
opportunities in two categories:  
•  Opportunities that apply beyond the Onkaparinga catchment 
boundaries related to implementation of Council Of Australian 
Government (COAG) water price reform provisions, and 
•  Opportunities related to specific reticulated water and sewage 
disposal pricing policies in the Onkaparinga catchment. 
COAG Reform Recommendations 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Water Reform 
Framework is driving change in water policy. Because not all COAG 
reforms have yet been fully implemented and how they are 
implemented will influence resource use in the Onkaparinga 
catchment, effort to influence implementation can have significant E XECUTIVE S UMMARY 
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local impact.  Recommendations regarding three COAG provisions are 
summarised below.  
State-wide uniform water prices by user type—Under current State 
policy one price for reticulated water is charge to all household water 
users. Yet water can be supplied at a much lower cost to Adelaide than 
to outlying areas.  COAG reforms discourage such cross subsidisation.  
While the OCWMB may wish to acknowledge the importance of public 
investment to maintain a vital rural Australia, the Board may wish to 
consider advocating rural development policies that preserve the social 
benefits of a vibrant rural economy but do not contradict important 
environmental goals like water conservation. 
Separation of regulatory and management roles of government in 
water supply—COAG reform advocates separating the regulatory and 
the management role of government in water provision. Essentially the 
goal is to open the State water provision monopoly to competition. By 
separating the two functions, under favourable circumstances a 
competitive environment can be fostered that benefits consumers who 
would face lower costs.  However, there are potential costs of water 
utility privatisation including:  
•  high costs of regulatory efforts to research and regulate 
private monopoly pricing, and consequently higher water 
prices. 
•  competitors with State water utilities attempting to pick off 
the choice customers (large users who are relatively 
inexpensive to supply) by offering a lower price.   
While OCWMB may wish to acknowledge that increased competition in 
water supply and regulation can have desirable outcomes, they may 
also wish to stress that such reform can have negative consequences 
and advocate a “go slow” approach. 
Full cost recovery water pricing including environmental costs—
COAG water reforms require that water prices be set so that revenues 
from water sales cover all operating costs, on-going maintenance 
costs, capital expenses necessary for ongoing operation, and costs of 
water use to the environment.  Championing the COAG full cost water 
pricing concept may represent a good strategy to achieve a core 
OCWMB objective of maintenance of catchment water quality. The 
specific recommendations with respect to water and sewerage pricing 
below are all pricing approaches to water prices that are supported in 
principle by the COAG full cost water pricing provision. E XECUTIVE S UMMARY 
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Water Pricing Recommendations 
Water pricing that reflects the true cost of water use is a fundamental 
requirement in any policy designed to encourage economically 
efficient and environmentally sustainable water use.  There are several 
elements of the current water price scheme faced by Onkaparinga 
catchment water consumers that discourage water conservation and 
sewage disposal minimisation. The Board may wish to advocate the 
following specific water pricing reforms to encourage improved water 
quality and reduced water consumption in the catchment:  
•  Change the current reticulated water pricing system so that 
pricing is primarily volumetric (a function of water use level).  
The current system a fixed charge for a base volume and a 
charge for every KL thereafter.  From an environmental 
perspective, a smaller volume offered at a fixed price and 
higher charges per KL would be desirable, as it would 
encourage conservation.   
•  Best estimates are that as much as 50% of residential water in 
Adelaide is used for watering lawns and gardens in the 
summer months.  A price scheme that charged higher prices 
for summer water demand over a base volume could reduce 
this demand significantly.  
•  Another water pricing reform that OCWMB may consider 
advocating is a change in sewerage charges to include at least 
some volumetric pricing component.  The current price of 
sewage disposal paid by households is based on property value 
and consequently includes no incentive to limit disposal. At 
least in the case of significant industrial clients, it would seem 
that the cost of installing sewage meters and charging 
volumetrically could produce benefits that exceed the 
additional infrastructure and monitoring cost. For households, 
it may also be possible to roughly relate sewerage charges to 
water use charges.  
Pricing as one of a Suite of Policies 
There are limits to controlling water use and sewage disposal with 
price alone.  
•  Even significant increases in water price sometimes barely 
influence demand because water expenditures still only 
represent a very small portion of most household budgets.   
•  Utilities are often concerned about revenue implications of 
aggressive volumetric pricing reforms because if long run 
response is very significant conservation, reductions in 
revenue can result, and utilities can be left with insufficient 
revenue to cover costs. E XECUTIVE S UMMARY 
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•  There may also be some consumer or industry resistance to 
aggressive volumetric pricing or lowering of fixed charge 
components of current water pricing.   
As a result pricing policies alone are limited.  Australian and 
international experience shows that approaches including direct price 
signals, as well as, subsidy and educational approaches to encourage 
water saving technology adoption (i.e. low flush toilets, and irrigation 
timers) work best.  In Report three that will follow, a broader suite of 
opportunities that the Board can pursue in partnership with State 
Agencies, the Commonwealth, Councils, catchment residents and 
businesses are reviewed including: 
•  introducing rebates to existing levies to encourage good 
natural resource management practices; 
•  using market based mechanisms like transferable property 
rights to complement direct regulation of water resources 
with water allocation plans; 
•  Voluntary educational and incentive approaches to encourage 
conservation and sewage disposal minimization.  
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1 Introduction 
This is the second report of four on research being prepared by CSIRO 
Land and Water Policy and Economics Research Unit for the 
Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board (OCWMB). The first 
report described the institutional framework and impediments to 
water and land management practices that are economically efficient, 
fair, and achieve water quantity and quality goals. This second report 
examines pricing mechanisms that could be employed to improve 
catchment management given the information constraints and 
asymmetries
1 that tend to occur in a complex institutional framework, 
as well as the gaps in the scientific understanding of the catchment.  
Pricing alone is unlikely to achieve all the goals and objectives of a 
Catchment Water Management Board. 
The key to successful management of the catchment, which balances 
long term sustainability with economic development, is coordinated 
action by multiple layers of government to line up incentives in the 
interests of the whole of catchment.  Water pricing is one incentive 
mechanism and the emphasis of this report.  However, as the third 
report outlines in detail, pricing along with other policy mechanisms 
form a portfolio of tools that can be used to influence incentives for 
sustainable land and water use.  The full suite of policy tools includes: 
•  setting and using price signals to manage change, 
•  establishing environmental regulation, 
•  using markets to move water to highest and best use within a 
catchment, 
•  inducing land and water use change with incentives, and  
•  employing environmental management and accreditation 
systems. 
A persistent theme in all four reports in this series is the fact that 
there are many different players in the Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board (OCWMB) area
2 with very different goals and 
authority to change institutional rules and policy.  This means that the 
OCWMB does not have full control of all the tools to manage change.  
                                             
1   Information asymmetries refer to a situation where a regulator and a firm have 
different information i.e. the firm knows more about what it cost to conserve 
resources, prevent an accident or other features of firm cost structure than 
regulators do. 
2  From this point forward in the report, the Onkaparinga Catchment or Catchment 
will refer to the jurisdiction of the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management 
Board.  More generic terms such as watershed will be used to refer to broader 
geographic areas. I NTRODUCTION 
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Still OCWMB does have considerable influence. For example, it has 
been a leader in putting in place cross-jurisdiction agreements such as 
the waiver of Division 2 (property based) levies on lands in Natural 
Vegetation Heritage Agreements.  In this report opportunities are 
discussed that are available to OCWMB to influence water pricing that 
are within their direct authority, as well as opportunities to influence 
higher level State policies. A NALYTICAL F RAMEWORK 
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2 Analytical  Framework 
There is no single practical economic tool suitable for managing a 
water catchment because of the intricate relationships between 
people, land and water.  The water catchment is an ecosystem 
supporting a variety of life as well as people with their social and 
economic aspirations.  The art of managing the resource will be 
devising a portfolio of tools and selecting an optimal mix in order to 
send signals that move the various parties with an interest in the water 
catchment in the desired directions. 
The analytical framework that is used throughout the report focuses on 
the incentive mechanisms that have the potential to balance 
objectives and offer new ways of thinking about managing the diverse 
interests of the catchment or what we will call the whole of catchment 
management.  As discussed in the first report of this series, the 
Onkaparinga Catchment consists of a variety of ecosystem types, 
economic uses, rural and urban areas, etc. all dependent on land and 
water.  Even if the Onkaparinga Catchment consisted of a single 
homogenous economic use, there is more than one natural resource 
being utilised—namely water and land.  If the focus is on maximising 
economic benefits of water use alone, inefficient land use can occur.  
Tinbergen (1950) suggested that efficient multi-objective public 
management requires a portfolio of tools, rather than single tools such 
as regulation or a tax.  For example, water trading will provide 
efficient water use only if supported by an appropriate suite of 
instruments designed to generate protection against the externalities 
that can occur as the result of irrigation induced salinity loading. 
Multi-objective natural resource problems require identifying all the 
possible and relevant tools that might be employed in pursuing these 
goals.  Gaining access or influence over some tools may require a 
longer time frame.  Alternatively waiting for the right opportunity to 
have input into the development or revision of new policies and 
legislation may be required.   
The review of the Water Resources Act 1997 that is currently 
underway, presents such an opportunity.  Another longer term 
opportunity is the pricing of reticulated water, as the State 
government may be receptive to well put arguments concerning 
altering State-wide uniform water prices by customer class during the 
next round of policy setting.  This may well fit in with the Board's 
strategy of capacity building and the crucial phase of scientific data 
collection.  This will enable the Board to strive towards attaining some 
of its longer-term goals. 
Given the variety of agencies and institutions identified in the first 
report of this series, one of the important issues to consider is how to 
get the incentives right so that everyone with an interest in utilising A NALYTICAL F RAMEWORK 
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the resources of the catchment has the incentive to act in a manner 
consistent with whole of catchment management.  Grape growers, SA 
Water and homeowners in Christies Beach will all have different 
private short-term objectives.  Thus one tool, even a good tool, is 
unlikely to produce a full set of desired results.  While this report 
focuses on water pricing alone, the next report will examine how 
deficiencies in a water pricing approach alone can be addressed with 
other policy instruments.   B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
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3  Background COAG Water Pricing Reforms  
COAG Water Pricing Reform Agenda 
Much of the reform in the area of water has been motivated by Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) agreements.  COAG is comprised of 
heads of Federal (Commonwealth of Australia) and State/Territory 
governments plus a representative from local government.  Water is 
one of many sectors of the economy that have come under the scrutiny 
of COAG. COAG has developed a national policy called the COAG Water 
Reform Framework for the efficient and sustainable reform of 
Australia's rural and urban water industries.  In developing its 
framework, COAG adopted a position which requires a consistent 
approach to water reform throughout Australia.   
The key elements of COAG water reforms include directives that:  
1.  All water pricing is to be based on the principles of full cost 
recovery and transparency of cross-subsidies.  
2.  Any future new investment in irrigation schemes, or 
extensions to existing schemes, are to be undertaken only 
after appraisal indicates it is economically viable and 
ecologically sustainable.  
3.  States and Territory governments, through relevant agencies, 
are to implement comprehensive systems of water allocations 
or entitlements. Entitlements are to be backed by the 
separation of water property rights from land and include 
clear specification of entitlements in terms of ownership, 
volume, reliability, transferability and, if appropriate, quality. 
4.  The formal determination of water allocation entitlements, 
including allocations for the environment as a legitimate user 
of water are to be undertaken. 
5.  Trading, including cross border sales, of water allocations and 
entitlements is to be within the social or physical and 
ecological constraints of catchments. 
6.  An integrated catchment management approach to water 
resource management is to be adopted. 
7.  The separation, as far as possible, of resource management 
and regulatory roles of government from water service 
provision is to be maintained. B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
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8.  Greater responsibility at the local level for the management 
of water resources is to be adopted. 
9.  Greater public education about water use, appropriate 
research into water use efficiency technologies, and 
consultation in the implementation of water reforms is to be 
offered. 
Source : http://www.affa.gov.au/water-reform/facts2.htm  
(June 18, 2001) 
Each State and Territory was given the flexibility to adopt its own 
approach to implementation depending on its own unique institutional 
and natural characteristics.  All parties agreed that the full framework 
would be implemented by the year 2001.  The package of diverse but 
interrelated requirements developed within the framework was 
designed to generate an economically viable and ecologically 
sustainable water industry in both urban and rural areas. 
The requirement to meet certain targets each year over the period 
1999 to 2001 in order to receive a series of Tranche payments has 
encouraged the States and Territories to make some progress along the 
path to implementation of the reforms.  The progress has not been 
uniform across the States and Territories reflecting different political 
realities. 
South Australia already had an institutional framework in place, the 
Water Resources Act 1997, allowing many COAG mandated reforms.  
The separation of title to land and water is an important feature of the 
Act and has facilitated trade within the State and among the States of 
NSW, Victoria and SA.  The Act also refined the framework for putting 
in place Catchment Water Management Boards and allowed South 
Australia to satisfy items 3, 4, 6 and 8 from the list of COAG reforms on 
the previous page. 
Implications of the COAG reforms for Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board 
The COAG framework probably provided much needed impetus to put 
more control in local hands and encourage communities to become 
more involved in the management of natural resources.  This is likely 
the most important outcome of the COAG framework from the 
perspective of the Catchment.  Local influence can be asserted 
through the consultation process and the development of Management 
and Water Allocation Plans.  The processes afford more opportunity for 
dialogue with the Department for Water Resources and communities.  
Finally there is considerable scope for Catchment Water Management 
Boards to exert some influence over the development of policies 
regarding penalties and levies.   B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
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Elements of the package of reforms shape the environment in which 
the Catchment Boards operate.  For instance, the enhancement of a 
competitive environment through the separation of the regulatory role 
of government from the operational role influences how organisations 
such as SA Water view natural resource management and the role of 
conservation.  More directly, the evolution of the property rights 
framework, i.e. the separation of the title to water and title to land 
affords an opportunity for using trading mechanisms to improve the 
efficient use of water.  There are still improvements and 
enhancements that could be made to the property rights system.  An 
example cited in the last report of this series is the need for a Torrens 
Title System for water to improve security of title.  Other issues such 
as separating the right to a volume of water from access rights to 
improve efficiency in the use of land and water will be considered in 
the next report. 
The COAG framework by devolving responsibility has also introduced 
the concomitant need for layers of government and agencies to better 
coordinate their activities.  Many of these mechanisms are developing 
or are already in place.  An example is how the Catchment Water 
Management Plans must be consistent with the State Water Plan—the 
processes must roll-up together.  Other mechanisms have developed 
such as regular meetings of Catchment General Managers and other 
forums for discussion where members of different Catchment Boards 
meet to discuss issues. 
Four Key COAG Issues 
The four State-wide water policy reform issues enumerated below are 
discussed in detail in the remainder of this report because they are 
especially relevant to the Onkaparinga Catchment: 
•  State-wide uniform water prices by user type,  
•  separation of regulatory and management roles of 
government, and opening the State water supply monopoly to 
competition,  
•  accounting for full cost recovery in water pricing  generally, 
and 
•  accounting for costs of environmental degradation in water 
pricing specifically. 
The first three are all discussed in fairly general terms in this section 
of the report because while the issues are of some importance to 
OCWMB, policy related to these issue will primarily be determined at 
the State level.  The final issue, accounting for environmental cost in 
water pricing forms a large part of the next section on water pricing 
because it is probably the issue of greatest direct relevance to the 
core mission of OCWMB.  In addition the Board is well positioned to B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
 WATER  PRICING  15 
influence at least some of the key policy environment variables related 
to the issue. 
State-Wide Uniform Water Prices for All Users of Each Type 
One contentious issue related to COAG has been cross-subsidies. A 
cross-subsidy occurs when a uniform price is charged but the cost of 
supplying differs by customer type.  Under current State policy one 
price for reticulated water is charged to all urban water users in the 
State.  Yet it can be supplied at a much lower cost to Adelaide than to 
outlying areas.  For example, the AWA (2000) reports that the cost of 
supplying water to Whyalla is $680 per ML and $430 per ML for 
Adelaide.  COAG reforms discourage cross-subsidies because they tend 
to encourage inefficient use by the ‘under-priced’ customer type.   
Fairness as well as efficiency remain key policy drivers in the State. 
The State argues that State-wide uniform pricing by water user type is 
important for reasons of economic development outside the Adelaide 
area.  The State has argued with the National Competition Council 
(NCC) that this policy is transparent as required by COAG.  
The OCWMB may wish to acknowledge the social value of rural 
development policy.  However, they may also wish to stress that 
reform provisions to include costs of environmental degradation in 
water price are essential to preserving ecosystem integrity.  
Consequently, the Board could consider advocating rural development 
policies that preserve the social benefits of a vibrant rural economy 
but do not contradict important environmental goals like water 
conservation. 
Separation of Regulatory and Management Roles of Government and 
Opening State Monopoly to Competition 
The separation of the regulatory role and the management role of 
government in water management and opening the State water 
provision monopoly to competition are additional goals of COAG that 
have encountered some resistance. While laudable in theory, 
separation of management and regulation may not always be desirable 
in reality.  By separating the two functions, under favourable 
circumstances a competitive environment can be fostered.  However, 
in industries like reticulated water where only a few firms or a 
monopoly tend to dominate the extraction and processing of the 
resource, the efficiency of such separation can be argued.  A market 
dominated by a few firms, usually indicates that there are barriers to 
entry such as a decreasing cost structure (where costs falls as amount 
supplied increases), possession of a unique technology or process, or 
government franchise.  B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
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Reticulated water production costs tend to be lower for single firm 
monopolies (like SA Water) than they would be if there were many 
smaller firms. However, industries with one or few firms are not 
subject to the competition that insures consumer interests are 
protected.  Public utility review boards are often set up when private 
utility monopolies are introduced to ensure that the public interest is 
not forsaken by a firm that is able exert considerable market control.   
COAG induced reforms, leading to separating the roles of management 
and regulation, may in some instance actually be counter-productive. 
The essential problem is that the best alternative to the current SA 
Water may be a monopoly operated as a private sector firm but 
regulated in terms of its price.  Under such circumstances the private 
monopoly has an incentive to conceal its cost structure from the State 
regulator.  If anything the private monopoly has the incentive to 
overState its costs.  The State and consumers could potentially 
encounter two costs from privatisation that it would not with a State 
run monopoly. Taxpayers would face high costs of efforts to research 
and regulate the private monopoly, and consumers may face higher 
water prices if the private monopoly succeeds in convincing the State 
that water prices above cost of water provision are required. 
An additional issue related to encouraging competition in water supply 
is that the State monopoly can be faced with competitors attempting 
to pick off the choice customers (large users who are relatively 
inexpensive to supply) by offering a lower price.  The result can be 
increasing unit cost to the existing monopoly in supplying smaller and 
more remote customers that private firms aren’t willing to service. If 
the State monopoly is forced to charge such smaller and more remote 
customers higher prices, demand can decline further and eventually 
the State may not be able to develop a pricing structure that covers 
cost. 
As with the uniform water pricing issue, OCWMB may have limited 
influence on the State’s position on these issues.  While OCWMB may 
wish to acknowledge that increased competition in water supply and 
regulation can have desirable outcomes, for the reasons outlined 
above the issue is not straight forward and any moves toward reform in 
this area need to be carefully considered.  Most importantly, however, 
OCWMB might wish to argue for a “go slow” policy with respect to 
separation of supply and regulatory authority. Additionally, the 
OCWMB may wish to advocate that increased private sector 
competition should not slow down water pricing reforms that support 
important environmental goals. 
Full Cost Recovery Water Pricing 
Full cost recovery pricing has proven to be another difficult COAG 
reform agenda item for South Australia, as well as other States.  The B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
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State has taken minimal steps towards full cost recovery pricing. In 
particular little action has been taken to encourage incorporating the 
cost to the environment of water usage into water pricing. This is 
perhaps the single COAG reform agenda item of greatest importance to 
OCWMB objectives of preserving the integrity of the catchment 
ecosystem.  
Progress has been slow because setting prices for essential goods 
creates challenges for governments who must consider competing 
interests and perceptions of fairness.  Musgrave (2000) illustrates the 
nature of such conflicts well in their evaluation of the open public 
process taken by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
(IPART) in NSW moving to reform bulk water prices for irrigation 
companies and towns. 
The full cost recovery water pricing regime advocated by COAG 
contains five key items: 
•  consumption based pricing and full cost recovery should be 
implemented by 1998 for urban water services and by 2001 for 
rural water supplies, 
•  cross subsidies should be made transparent and where possible 
the cross subsidies should be eliminated, 
•  cost recovery should include environmental costs, the costs of 
asset consumption, and the cost of capital, 
•  positive real rates of return on written down replacement cost 
of assets should be included in water prices, and 
•  future investments in new schemes or extensions should be 




_reform/coag.pdf  (June 18, 2001) 
The full cost of water, whether delivered to urban users through a 
reticulation system, or pumped from an aquifer by an irrigator takes 
into account: 
•  operating expenses—all the expenses incurred as part of normal 
day to day operations including the electricity required for 
pumping water, wages and benefits, etc. 
•  on-going maintenance costs—all the expenses incurred as part 
of the planned and unplanned repairs and replacements of 
capital infrastructure required to continue operating the water 
delivery system at current performance levels. B ACKGROUND COAG  W ATER P RICING R EFORMS 
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•  cost of monitoring, research—due to the complexity of the 
problems associated with managing water dependent 
ecosystems, the collection of baseline information is crucial.  
Arguably the full cost of water should include the cost of 
research - to the extent that it is relevant and necessary.  A 
research levy on all water bought and sold would be in line with 
the current levy used to fund food and agriculture research (ie. 
RIRDC, GRDC, PRDC use funds from this levy to leverage 
agricultural research). 
•  third party impacts or cost to the environment—water use and 
water disposal by one party often imposes costs on others down 
stream. For example, farm dam water capture can impose third 
party damages by reducing water in reservoirs available for 
reticulated water consumers, and environmental flows vital to 
ecosystems preservation. True full cost recovery water pricing 
would charge each water user the cost of any damages they 
impose downstream as part of the price of water.   
In addition to accounting for the four costs above, full cost water 
pricing would require that pricing rules are forward looking, only 
taking into account the components of cost that affect day to day and 
future operations.  This means that while maintenance cost should 
include capital expenditures necessary to continued operation of a 
water delivery system, repayment for initial cost of infrastructure 
should not be included.  The reason is that these costs are “sunk” 
meaning that tax payers are stuck with paying for them whether or not 
the delivery system is operated.  We are stuck with the capital costs of 
these systems even if new infrastructure would have lower capital 
costs. Consequently, it is economically efficient to only consider the 
cost of continuing to operate these systems, rather than to compare 
the amortised cost of initial investment plus operating cost of existing 
and potential projects. 
Again OCWMB may have only limited direct influence on how reform in 
the area of full cost pricing evolves.  Still it is important from a 
strategic perspective that the Board carefully monitor developments in 
this area, so that they can lobby against reform that works against 
their main objective of increased catchment sustainability.  For 
example, in the reform process argument it may be argued that 
supplying water to larger industrial users is generally less costly than 
supplying residential users on a per KL basis.  However, if the 
environmental cost of water use and sewage disposal by industrial 
users is in fact considerably greater than for residential uses the Board 
may find it expedient not to support lower relative water prices for 
industrial water without mechanisms to account for environmental 
costs. W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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4  Water Pricing Issues and Options 
How water is priced is of crucial importance for setting the balance 
between water use and conservation, between use in urban areas, 
agriculture and industry.  While it is natural to think of the rates that 
water users pay as “the price” of water, in fact the effective price of 
water or its cost to users is determined by three key factors that 
jointly determine permissible allocations and their cost: 
1.  Government imposed charges on water use and disposal paid 
either by water users or water suppliers influence water cost 
directly. 
2.  Government regulations regarding how water can be used and 
disposed of can either limit the range of permissible 
allocations or their cost. 
3.  Government rules defining how water rights can be traded are 
a particular form of regulation. They will be treated 
separately from other regulation in this reporting because 
they not only influence the cost of water in “own” use, but 
signal to water rights holders how the value of water in its 
current use compares to its value in alternative uses. 
This report focuses on the issues directly related to water charges.  
The role of regulation and water trading in influencing efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability of water allocation will be discussed in the 
next part of this study.   
Current Water Pricing in the Onkaparinga Catchment 
In South Australia, the price of water is determined each year by 
Cabinet in early December.  The Cabinet Submission, made by SA 
Water, contains plans for capital works and targets for dividends.  
Cabinet balances conflicting goals of fairness, economic development 
and balanced budgets. The result of this public process has been that 
the government has been reluctant to significantly alter uniform State-
wide pricing by user type, raise the price of water or increase 
catchment levies significantly.   
Presently, reticulated water is provided throughout the State at one 
price across each customer class: 
•  A residential customer pays a fixed component of $123 per 
annum and 36 cents per KL for the first 125 kilolitres and 92 
cents per KL thereafter. 
•  Industrial and country lands pay an annual access charge of 
$136 and 91 cents per KL. W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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•  The commercial sector is on an allowance system where the 
customer pays a property rate of 0.213% and receives an 
allowance based on the property rate charge divided by 91 
cents a KL.  The minimum property rate charge is $136. 
Sewerage charges include a flat access charge based on property 
values.  The property rate for 1999/2000 for metropolitan areas was 
0.256% and the rate in country areas was 0.323%.  The different access 
charges applied to city and country reflect the lower property values 
in the country.  Landowners in areas with sewerage infrastructure can 
apply for a dispensation from the Sewerage Act and have their 
proposed system assessed by the Department of Human Services 
(formerly Health Commission).  In areas that have a Septic Tank 
Effluent Disposal (STED) system, some councils may require an 
approved septic tank system and levy charges for connection to the 
STED disposal system. 
About 74% of reticulated water in the Onkaparinga catchment goes to 
residential use, 6% to 9% is used by agriculture, and the remainder 
goes to other industrial uses (OCWMP, 2001). However, there is 
significant use of water from other sources by agricultural irrigators.  
In 1999 a total of nearly 14 000 ha was planted to crops that are 
typically irrigated in the catchment, with 9 294 ha in grapevines, 3 798 
ha in horticultural crops and orchards, and 791 ha in field crops 
(OCWMP, 2001).  A significant portion the irrigated crop area is within 
the McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells Area (MVPWA). In 1999 7378 ha and 
1666 ha in the MVPWA was planted in vineyards and orchards 
respectively (MVPWA Background to Water Allocation Plan, 2000). The 
only charges for groundwater pumping outside the MVPWA are 
application fees for wells and a property-based levy.  Within the 
MVPWA there is a water-based levy of 1 cent per KL. 
The Challenge of Incorporating External Costs in Water Price  
There are significant environmental costs associated with urban 
reticulated water use, capture of run-off in reservoirs and farm dams 
and rural water diversion for agriculture. There is also significant 
scope to reduce these environmental costs with water pricing policies.  
What is known to date, suggests that there are six main environmental 
costs associated with water use in the Onkaparinga Catchment: 
1.  Nutrient and pesticide loading and turbidity resulting from 
agricultural land use can lead to declines in ecosystems and 
fishery health. 
2.  Primary production and municipal irrigation can raise 
groundwater tables, especially in low lying areas of McLaren 
Vale. W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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3.  Adverse fishery, ecosystems and human health impacts are a 
potential result of treated sewage pumped into the St. 
Vincent Gulf. 
4.  Flood plain ecosystem health impacts result from water 
management that limits episodic flooding. 
5.  Ecosystems health is impacted by run-off captured in Mt. Bold 
reservoir and farm dams. 
6.  Salinity loading of the river(s) effects farm productivity, 
public and private infrastructure for water delivery and 
sewage disposal, and floodplain ecosystem health. 
Economists describe environmental costs associated with water using 
the term externality or external cost.  The technical definition of an 
externality is a cost (or benefit) that is borne by third parties to a 
market transaction.  The theory of environmental economics suggests 
that with no government policy intervention those who suffer will 
compensate those who cause damage in a way that improves the well 
being of all.  However, two preconditions must exist: 1) those who 
create externalities and those who suffer as a result must be able to 
easily find each other and negotiate, and 2) both parties must have 
nearly costless access to the information required to quantify costs of 
damages.  In practice, this privately negotiated solution is rarely 
possible because the external costs of environmental damage are 
spread across individuals and the landscape making it difficult and 
expensive to monitor pollution flows, assign responsibility for resultant 
damages and quantify the costs of damages.  As a result, public 
intervention is typically the only effective approach to mitigate 
externalities.   
Designing an effective public externality pricing policy is challenging. 
In theory, the externality problem can be addressed with a set of 
environmental levies or taxes known in the economics literature as 
Pigovian taxes (Pearce and Turner, 1992). In the case of water use 
externalities, the approach would involve charges on water use such 
that each water user paid the cost per unit of water delivered plus an 
additional charge per unit water equal to the external damage cost 
imposed on others. To charge each water user for the exact external 
cost that their actions impose on others is impractical.  This would 
require estimates of the environmental damage in dollar terms that 
additional increments of water use cause for each water user and 
development of a set of differential charges reflecting damage costs. 
Source: (Pezzey 1988 ) W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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River Murray Water Salinity Impacts in the Onkaparinga—An 
Illustration of the Challenge of Including Externality Cost in Water 
Price  
In many cases water used in irrigated agriculture in the Murray River 
Basin is leading to rising water tables and salinity related losses of 
farmland productivity, and flood plain eco-systems damage.  Increased 
salt loads in the River Murray lead to downstream impacts on the 
Adelaide metropolitan area and because the Onkaparinga River is used 
as a conduit for River Murray water going to the Mount Bold Reservoir 
salinity impacts on the vegetation and biodiversity surrounding the 
Onkaparinga River result. 
Because impacts eventually experienced in the Onkaparinga have their 
origin far upstream in the Murray, identifying the source of damages 
and quantifying appropriate charges to “internalise” the externality is 
a major research challenge.  Introducing charges that reflect best 
estimates of external cost may also be politically challenging because 
periodic updates based on new data and improved techniques could 
lead to an unstable pricing situation that could be unpopular with 
residential and industrial water users. For example, while until 
recently each unit increase in EC levels in the Murray was estimated to 
have a cost of $125,000 (in year 2000 $) to the Adelaide area.  A CSIRO 
–Policy and Economic Research Unit project related to the National 
Land and Water suggests that updates of these numbers based on best 
available science may be much higher. 
 
Practical Solutions to Incorporating External Costs in Water Price 
While the theoretically best approach to incorporating external costs 
in water price, charging each user the cost of external damage they 
generate, is not practical, the Board does have an opportunity to 
advocate “second best” approaches that give the right signals. The 
point of practical pricing policies is to give water users, especially 
those who generate the largest external costs, price signals that align 
their personal interest with social objectives of reducing 
environmental damages related to their water use.  
If three principles are kept in mind in design of water and sewage 
disposal pricing systems, key advantages of the theoretically optimal 
approach to incorporating environmental cost in price can be 
maintained in practical price policy.  
1.  The price system should create the greatest incentive to 
reduce water use for those who generate the greatest W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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external cost because they are charged the highest 
environmental levy per unit water used.   
2.  The pricing system should balance environmental and 
economic development goals by allowing water users for 
whom the value of water in producing “dirty” products are 
high to continue some production if they are willing to pay 
high externality charges. Likewise the pricing system should 
discourage those for whom the value of water in production of 
“dirty” products are so low that they are unwilling to pay 
externality charges. 
3.  The water pricing system should encourage innovative 
approaches to water use that result in lower external costs 
because such approaches save water users money. 
Practical Approaches to Incorporating External Costs into 
Onkaparinga Catchment Water Prices 
Review of current water pricing practices in the Onkaparinga 
catchment for this research identified two key water pricing policy 
issues discouraging water conservation that can be addressed with the 
practical pricing solutions:  
1.  Residential water pricing based on a large fixed cost 
component and small marginal cost of each additional unit of 
water creates little incentive to conserve. 
2.  Industrial water pricing includes relatively little incentive for 
conservation as the price per unit of water does not increase 
as the volume of water used increases.  
Both issues relate to what is known as water pricing structure.  Five 
fundamentally different water pricing structures that have been used 
by various water providers in Australia and worldwide. The basic 
concept underlying each pricing structures and a brief discussion of key 
advantages and disadvantages of each structure is outlined in Table 1.   
At present, reticulated water for both industrial and domestic users is 
priced with a two-part tariff. As indicated in Table 1, two-part tariffs 
do encourage some conservation. The consensus from empirical 
research is that pricing policies that contain no volumetric component 
can significantly inhibit incentives to participate in any water 
conservation activities (Owens-Viani, 1999; Beecher and Mann, 1995). 
However, there is opportunity to improve conservation outcomes of 
water pricing. 
Two possible approaches are outlined below: W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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1. Reduce the fixed component of water pricing and increase 
volumetric charges.  This approach would address the disincentive 
water users currently have to consume any less than the volume of 
water provided at a fixed price. International experience shows that 
where pricing policy has been most successful in encouraging 
conservation, the fixed component of water charges has been minimal, 
and volumetric charges have been high. In Denmark, for example, 
large reductions in water use have been achieved with volumetric 
pricing at over ten times the rate currently charged in South Australia 
(DEPA,1999).  
2. Introduce higher volumetric prices in summer months or 
increasing block pricing as a form of peak load pricing. In the South 
Australian summer water demand is particularly high as the result of 
additional garden and swimming pool demand.  Best estimates are that 
as much as 50% of residential water in Adelaide is used for watering 
lawns and gardens (Allen and Pezzanti, 2001).  A peak demand pricing 
scheme could significantly influence this demand. For example, in the 
water limited U.S. city of San Antonio, Texas, a 30% summer water 
rate increase lead to reductions in water use of 12% to 14% (Fox, 
1995).   
One way to implement summer peak demand pricing in the 
Onkaparinga catchment would involve maintaining the current two- 
part tariff and increasing the volumetric component of pricing in 
summer. An alternative way to implement summer peak demand 
pricing would involve switching to an increasing block structure. Water 
users would pay a small fixed charge for a small fixed volume of water, 
and one rate for additional use up to a typical household demand level 
in the winter.  A higher price per unit of water would then be charged 
for summer irrigation demand in excess of normal winter use.   W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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Table 1  Different Pricing Strategies 
 
Either policy would be equitable in the sense that higher prices would 
only be charged for consumption in excess of normal winter demand. 
Additionally, either policy would be consistent with the principle of 
highest prices to signal highest value of conservation, as benefits of 
conserved water to supplement environmental flows are highest in the 
low flow summer months.   
Pricing 
Strategy 
Explanation Disadvantages  Advantages 
Fixed Charge  A fixed charge no 
matter the quantity 




Flat rate price  A single price per 
unit charged—no 
matter the quantity 




Two part tariff  A fixed component 
is paid no matter the 
quantity (this may 
vary based on user) 
and a variable 
component based 






service the large 
users. 








Each block is sold at 
a lower price 
respectively 





-  May result in 
losses in the 
long run 











Each block is sold at 
a higher price 
respectively 
reflecting lower per 
unit costs 
Encourages entry 
of competitors to 






Price is based on 
which season the 
water is delivered 
in*. 
The price signals 
have to be sent in 
a timely manner  
Encourages 
conservation when 
water is at its most 
valuable 
* Daytime versus night time premiums would require better metering systems and 
might be more efficiently dealt with regulations banning daytime watering of lawns 
and gardens. W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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Practical Approaches to Incorporating External Costs into 
Onkaparinga Catchment Water Disposal Prices 
Review of current sewerage water policy in the Onkaparinga 
catchment for this research identified the current sewerage pricing 
policy as the key issue discouraging reductions in sewage water 
disposal. Both residential and business sewerage charges are currently 
based on a percentage of property value, and do not relate to the 
volume of sewage generated.  Thus there is little incentive to reduce 
sewage volume. For example, no sewerage charge reductions would be 
experienced by a landowner who opted for aerobic systems where 
sewerage is available or a grey water reuse systems, even though such 
systems reduce sewage volumes entering the system.  
Charges for use of the sewerage system based on the volume of sewage 
generated would encourage reductions in the volume of sewage 
household and businesses produce through use of aerobic, grey water 
systems, etc.  Sewage volume based sewerage system charges would, 
however, only be feasible if sewage volumes were monitored, and they 
currently are not.  At least in the case of significant industrial clients, 
it would seem that the cost of installing sewage meters and charging 
volumetrically could generate benefits that exceed the additional 
infrastructure and monitoring cost. 
In the case of households, it may be possible to roughly relate 
sewerage charges to sewage disposal volume by charging for sewerage 
system use based on water use. The approach is imperfect in the sense 
that not all strategies to reduce sewage disposal result in reduced 
water demand. For example, while grey water reuse systems will 
reduce both water demand and sewage volume, aerobic systems 
reduce sewage volume without necessarily reducing water demand. 
Nonetheless, City West Water in Melbourne has taken this approach 
and achieved good results. 
Limitation to Pricing Alone as Water Use Management Approach 
The research literature leaves little doubt that pricing policy changes 
like reduced fixed component in water price and greater volumetric 
charges for water use can lead to significant water conservation.  
Nonetheless, there are limits to controlling water use and sewage 
disposal with price alone: 
•  Previous research findings suggest that unless radical 
volumetric pricing such as what has been used in Denmark 
(approximately ten times current South Australian per KL 
charges) little conservation may result. Even with significant 
increases in price, water expenditures still only represent a 
very small portion of most household budgets, so price 
changes barely influence demand (James, 1997; 
Dziegielkewski, 1992).   W ATER P RICING I SSUES AND O PTIONS 
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•  Utilities are often concerned about revenue implications of 
aggressive volumetric pricing reforms because if the long-run 
response is very significant conservation, reductions in 
revenue can result, and utilities can be left with insufficient 
revenue to cover costs. 
•  There may also be some consumer or industry resistance to 
aggressive volumetric pricing or lowering of fixed charge 
components of current water pricing.  According to the Water 
Services Association of Australia (1999), the volume of water 
that South Australians receive for fixed charge before they 
begin paying volumetric charges, 125KL is already less than 
the cut-off volume in other States.  For example, Sydney 
Water uses a cut-off of 165KL, and in ACT the cut-off is 300KL. 
While community resistance to SA water price increases in 
1998 were minimal, resistance that led to legal action could 
result in protracted legal fights as courts would have to weigh 
complex consumer protection, and environmental issues 
(Bjornland et. al., 2001). 
The important implication of the finding that pricing policies alone are 
limited is that the OCWMB may wish to consider advocating a multi-
tactical approach to encouraging water use and disposal reductions. 
Australian and international experience shows that approaches 
including direct price signals, as well as, subsidy and educational 
approaches to encourage water saving technology adoption (i.e. low 
flush toilets, and irrigation timers) work best.  The potential of such an 
approach is discussed in detail in report three in this series. 
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5 Conclusions  and  Recommendations 
This study evaluates the role of existing water pricing policies for 
sustain resource management in the Onkaparinga catchment.  The 
main objective of the report is to identify potential opportunities to 
improve water resource management in the catchment through water 
price policy reform.  Because the Board does not have a great deal of 
direct control over water prices, these opportunities generally require 
changes at the State level. These findings are still important because 
the Board can have influence with well-informed and persuasive 
arguments especially because in many cases the arguments for the 
OCWMB interest will reflect interests of other catchment boards. 
The conclusions and recommendations of this study fall primarily into 
two categories:  
•  General recommendations regarding implementation of 
general Council Of Australian Government (COAG) water price 
reform provisions, and 
•  Specific recommendations regarding pricing of reticulated 
water and sewage disposal by water utilities in the catchment 
COAG Reform Recommendations 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Water Reform 
Framework is driving change in water policy. The framework requires a 
consistent approach to water reform by all Australian State and local 
government. Because not all COAG reforms have yet been fully 
implemented and how they are implemented will influence resource 
use in the Onkaparinga catchment, effort to influence implementation 
can have significant local impact.  Thus recommendations regarding 
how three key COAG provisions especially relevant to the OCWMB 
might best be implemented are summarised below.  
State-wide uniform water prices by user type—Under current State 
policy one price for reticulated is charged to all household water 
users. Yet it can be supplied at a much lower cost to Adelaide than to 
outlying areas.  COAG reforms discourage such cross subsidisation.  
While the OCWMB may wish to acknowledge the importance of public 
investment to maintain a vital rural Australia, the Board could consider 
advocating rural development policies that preserve the social benefits 
of a vibrant rural economy but do not contradict important 
environmental goals like water conservation.    
 C ONCLUSIONS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 
 WATER  PRICING  29 
Separation of regulatory and management roles of government in 
water supply—COAG reform advocates separating the regulatory and 
management roles of government in water management. Essentially 
the goal is to open the State water provision monopoly to competition. 
By separating the two functions, under favourable circumstances, a 
competitive environment can be fostered that benefits consumers who 
face lower water costs as a result.  However, water utility privatisation 
has potential disadvantages including:  
•  The high costs of regulatory efforts to research and a private 
water provision monopoly, and potentially higher water prices 
as a result. 
•  Potentially increasing per unit cost in some areas as a result of 
competitors with State water utilities attempting to pick off 
the choice customers (large users who are relatively 
inexpensive to supply) by offering a lower price in some areas.   
While OCWMB may wish to acknowledge that increased competition in 
water supply and regulation can have desirable outcomes, they may 
also wish to stress that such reform can have negative consequences 
and advocate a “go slow” approach. 
Full cost recovery water pricing  including  environmental costs—
COAG water reforms require that water prices should be set so that 
revenues from water sales cover all operating, on-going maintenance, 
capital expense necessary to ongoing operation, and third impact costs 
to the environment.  Championing the COAG full cost water pricing 
concept may represent a good strategy to achieve a core OCWMB 
objective of maintenance of catchment water quality. The specific 
recommendations with respect to water and sewerage pricing below 
are all pricing approaches to water prices that are supported in 
principle by the COAG full cost water pricing provision. 
Water Pricing Recommendations 
Water pricing that reflects the true cost of water use is a fundamental 
requirement in any policy designed to encourage economically 
efficient, and environmentally sustainable water use.  Some of true 
costs of water use are difficult and/or costly to accurately estimate, 
especially environmental costs. Still, existing pricing systems can often 
be modified in straightforward ways that create the greatest incentive 
to reduce water use for those who generate the greatest external cost 
because they are charged the highest price per unit water used.   
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There are several elements of the current water price scheme faced by 
Onkaparinga catchment water consumers that discourage water 
conservation and sewage disposal minimisation. The Board may wish to 
advocate the following specific water pricing reforms to encourage 
improved water quality and reduced water consumption in the 
catchment:  
•  Change the current reticulated water pricing system so that 
pricing is primarily volumetric (a function of water use level).  
The current system includes a fixed charge for a base volume 
and a charge for every KL thereafter.  From an environmental 
perspective, a smaller base volume offered at a fixed price 
and higher charges per KL would be desirable, as it would 
encourage conservation.   
•  Best estimates are that as much as 50% of residential water in 
Adelaide is used for watering lawns and gardens in the 
summer months.  A pricing scheme that charged higher prices 
for summer water demand over a base volume could reduce 
this demand significantly.  
•  Another water pricing reform that OCWMB may consider 
advocating is a change in sewerage charges to include at least 
some volumetric pricing component.  The current price of 
sewage disposal households pay is based on property value and 
consequently includes no incentive to limit disposal. At least 
in the case of significant industrial clients, it would seem that 
the cost of installing sewage meters and charging 
volumetrically could private benefits that exceed the 
additional infrastructure and monitoring cost. For households, 
it may also be possible to roughly relate sewerage charges to 
water use charges.  
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